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Abstract 
 
Lone mothers are overrepresented among poor people in many European countries. In 1998, 
in Norway, a welfare reform increased the amount of benefits and introduced working 
requirements. Using a quasi-experimental model, Mogstad and Pronzato (2012) find a 
positive effect of the reform on lone mothers’ labour supply and a small reduction in poverty. 
Is the best result that policy makers could obtain in terms of poverty reduction? In this paper, 
I estimate a discrete choice model of earnings and welfare participation decisions, and use the 
behavioural estimates to derive the policy parameters which would have minimized poverty 
among lone mothers. 
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Fighting Lone Mothers’ Poverty through In-Work Benefits 
Methodological Issues and Policy Suggestions  
 
Chiara Daniela Pronzato 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Lone mothers are overrepresented among poor people in many European countries, with 
detrimental consequences for themselves and their children. Also in Norway, which is known as a 
country of economic and welfare success, lone mothers were at least three times more likely to be 
poor than married mothers with children in the same age-range. To this aim, in 1998, a reform of 
lone parental welfare was undertaken. The main changes involved the most generous benefits, the 
so-called transitional benefit.  The maximum amount of the benefits was increased, working 
requirements were introduced, and new time limits were imposed. Both lone mothers and lone 
fathers were eligible for the benefit, but the policy discussion concerning the transitional benefit 
and how to reform it to avoid work disincentives was carried out primarily thinking about lone 
mothers’ work and poverty rates. The reasons are twofold. First of all, as much as 9 lone parents in 
10 were women at the time of the reform. But more importantly, the human capital levels and 
socio-economic status of lone fathers have been shown to differ substantially from those of lone 
mothers, presumably due to a strong selection process for lone  fathers to actually get daily 
custody of their children (Kjeldstad and Rønsen, 2004). 
Mogstad and Pronzato (2012), using a quasi-experimental model, find a positive effect of the 
reform on lone mothers’ labour supply and a small reduction in poverty. Is the best result that 
policy makers could obtain in terms of poverty reduction given the amount of public resources 
invested? Using the reform as an instrument, in a quasi-experimental setting, we cannot answer 
this question. We can understand whether lone mothers’ behaviour is influenced by public 
policies, without strong assumptions and referring only intuitively to the economic theory. 
However, we cannot distinguish the effects of the different parts of the reform, cannot 
understand the mechanisms, and cannot predict what kind of policy would have made lone 
mothers better off.  To know what policy would make lone mothers less likely to be poor, we need 
a more structural approach: thinking what matters for lone mothers’ decisions (income, hours of 
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work, age of the children,…), estimate what weight they give to income, hours of work,... when 
taking decisions, and use the estimates behavioural parameters to predict new policy scenarios. 
Nevertheless the advantages of a structural model in providing policy suggestions, structural 
models are based on relatively stronger assumptions compared to quasi-experimental methods. 
How can be sure that the economic model I construct and estimate can reproduce how women 
take their decisions in a realistic way? What I do in this paper is to simulate the changes brought 
by the 1998 reform in Norway using the behavioural estimates and then to compare its predictions 
with the effects of the reform estimated with a quasi-experimental design whose assumptions are 
considered less strong. Once validated the discrete choice model, I can use it for policy 
suggestions. 
The comparison between quasi-experimental methods and structural models for policy evaluation 
seems to be an area of research investigated only by a few papers, but necessary to give credibility 
to both the approaches, and to reconcile them. This is the appeal to young economists made by 
Keane (2006, 2010), during his keynote lecture at the Duke Conference on Structural Models in 
Labor, Aging and Health (2005), titled “Structural versus Atheoretic Approaches to Econometrics”. 
He underlines the necessity of considering descriptive statistics, reduced and structural forms as 
well as experimental methods as complementary approaches to the study of the effects of policy 
changes. He encourages researchers to perform validation exercises to test the extent to which 
structural models give “reasonable” predictions of the reality. The adjective “reasonable” may be 
still judged in a subjective way, but via multiple validation exercises consensus may be reached. 
Recently, as a part of the Mirrlees Review, Blundell (2012) has underlined the importance of 
different empirical strategies to evaluate the effects of earnings taxation on labour market 
decisions in order to design better tax policy reforms. 
Examples are offered by Todd and Wolpin (2006), Blundell (2006), Brewer et al. (2006), Keane and 
Wolpin (2007) and, more recently, by Bernal an Keane (2010), Hansen and Liu (2011), Geyen et al. 
(2012), Thoresen and Vattø (2012). Todd and Wolpin (2006) use data from a randomized social 
experiment in Mexico to study and validate a dynamic behavioural model of parental decisions 
about fertility and child schooling. The PROGRESA is a randomized social experiment implemented 
by the Mexican government, in which around 500 rural villages were randomly assigned to 
participate or not in the program which provided payments to parents who regularly send their 
children to school. They estimate the behavioural model without using observations from the 
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treated villages and predict the potential fertility and child schooling of families in untreated 
villages. The impact of the program predicted by the behavioural model tracks the experimental 
results. Keane and Wolpin (2007) adopt another approach to validate a behavioural model. They 
construct and estimate a dynamic structural model of female behaviour, in which work, welfare 
participation, marriage and fertility decisions are jointly considered. In order to validate the model, 
they use a “holdout sample”, a sample which differs from the sample used in the estimation and 
whose policy regime is well outside the support of the data. They use data from some US states to 
estimate the model, and from others to predict and validate the model. Bernal an Keane (2010) 
evaluate the effects of maternal work and childcare use on cognitive child development using a 
sample of single mothers in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. In order to take into 
account the selection process in work and childcare use, they develop a model of mothers’ 
employment and childcare decisions. To identify the model, they use exogenous variations in 
welfare rules and local demand conditions across States and over time. They also employ the same 
instrumental variables for a straight linear IV regression. The estimated effects on children’s 
cognitive development are very close when comparing the IV strategy and the structural model. 
While the above studies construct and estimate structural models which are dynamic, there is a 
number of empirical works which validate static structural models with quasi-experimental 
evidence and which mainly look at labour market changes due to a change in the welfare. Brewer, 
Duncan, Shephard and Suarez (2006) estimate a static structural model of labour supply and 
programme participation using data from before and after the introduction of the Working 
Families’ Tax Credit in the UK. They simulate the effect of the reform, taking into account all 
related changes in benefits and taxes, and compare the results with the ones obtained from other 
ex-ante (Blundell et al., 2000a, 2000b) and ex-post evaluations (Blundell et al., 2005; Francesconi 
and Van der Klaauw, 2004, 2007; Leigh, 2005; Gregg and Harkness, 2009). Blundell (2006) focuses 
on the effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit policies on lone mothers’ working decisions, by 
validating a structural model of labour supply with a difference-in-difference evaluation strategy, 
and then finds the optimal policy, defined by a certain social welfare function. Other recent papers 
compare results from quasi-experimental methods and structural models exploiting the 
introduction of a certain reform: Geyen, Hann, and Wrohlich (2012) estimate the introduction of a 
parental leave reform in Germany by comparing working behaviour of mothers of children born 
just before or after the reform and compare results with the ones obtained by a structural model 
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of return to work; Thoresen and Vattø (2012) evaluates a tax reform by comparing a before-after 
change in labour supply with the effect predicted by a structural model of labour supply; Hansen 
and Liu (2011) compares the effect of an increase of the generosity of welfare benefits for young 
people in Quebec predicted by their structural model of labour supply and welfare participation 
with the one estimated with a discontinuity regression model by Le Mieux and Milligan (2008).  
Using a similar approach in a comparable policy context as in Blundell (2006), in this paper, I 
validate a discrete choice model of work and welfare participation decisions with the results 
provided by a quasi-experimental design, using the same data and the same outcome variable for 
the two analyses. Once validated the discrete choice model, the behavioural parameters are then 
used to find the optimal policy, defined as the policy which provides the lowest level of poverty.  
The paper is organized as follows. The 1998 reform is described in Section 2. The two evaluation 
strategies (the quasi-experimental model and the discrete choice model) and the assumptions 
they rely on are explained in Section3, while the data are presented in Section 4. After estimating 
the behavioural parameters, the reform is simulated, and its predictions compared with the 
estimated effects obtained with the quasi-experimental method: despite the discrete choice 
model making stronger assumptions, the predictions from the discrete choice model are close to 
the quasi-experimental ones (Section 5). New policy scenarios are then simulated in Section 6 
while conclusions follow in Section 7. 
 
 
2 The 1998 Reform of the Transitional Benefit  
 
In this section I describe the transitional benefit and how has been changed with the 1998 reform. 
The reform is then directly evaluated through the quasi-experimental design while simulated 
through the discrete choice model. 
The transitional benefit used to be the most generous benefit targeted exclusively at lone parents, 
mainly taken-up by lone mothers. Lone mothers with at least one child younger than 10 years old 
used to receive up to 700€ per month. The receipt of the benefit was independent of their labour 
market decisions but 40% of their monthly earnings exceeding  200€ used to be withdrawn from 
the maximum amount. A reform of the transitional benefit was undertaken on the 1st of January 
1998. First, work requirements were imposed: lone mothers, in order to be eligible for the benefit, 
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were supposed to work at least part-time, to actively seek work, or to be in training.  However, the 
working requirements were only introduced for lone mothers with the youngest child older than 3 
years old. Second, the timing of the benefit was changed: lone mothers could receive the benefit 
until the youngest child was 8 years old (instead of 10)1 and for a period up to 3 years (while it was 
potentially 10 years before the reform). Finally, the maximum benefit amount was increased from 
around 700€ to 800€ per month.   
 
 
3 Evaluating the Effect of the Reform 
 
In this section, I describe the two methods used to evaluate the effect of the 1998 reform on lone 
mothers’ working decisions. The first strategy to evaluate the 1998 reform is a quasi-experimental 
design (a triple-difference model), where the working behaviour is compared before and after the 
1998, for a group of lone mothers (treatment group) and a group of married mothers (control 
group).  The second  is a discrete choice model where women are assumed to take their decisions 
about work and welfare participation under a certain budget constrain. After estimating the 
model, the changes brought by the 1998 reform (new working requirements, new age limits, 
increased amount of the benefit) are included in the model and the effect of the 1998 reform is 
simulated by using the estimated behavioural parameters.  
 
3.1 A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation Design 
In this sub-section, I introduce an evaluation design which exploits the availability of data on 
working decisions of mothers, before and after the time of the reform. However, I cannot use the 
classical difference-in-difference model, since I cannot observe exactly the same women both 
before and after the reform. The reform, in fact, is characterized by a long phase-in period: all lone 
mothers who were already in welfare at the time of the reform were allowed to receive the 
benefit according to the pre-reform rules for another 3 years. Therefore, lone mothers who may 
be observed both before and after the reform – whose observations could be used for a classical 
                                                          
1
 Before the refom a lone mother could receive the benefit until June of the 10
th
 birthday of the youngest child; after the 
reform, until the youngest does not become 9 years old. The main difference is that the ninth year of life of the child, 
after the reform, does not give the right to the benefit anymore.  
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difference-in-difference model - have basically no incentive to change their behaviour. Therefore, I 
evaluate the effect of the reform by comparing the effect of becoming a lone mother in the pre-
reform and post-reform period (Mogstad and Pronzato, 2012):   
 
0)]R0,S |YE(Y1)R0,S |Y [E(Y
0)]R1,S |YE(Y1)R1,S |Y [E(Yζ
vv1v1vvv1v1v
vv1v1vvv1v1v




              (1) 
 
where 
 
- Yv are the annual earnings of the woman  in the year v (hours of work are not available in 
the Register data, see Section 4) 
- Sv is equal to 1 if the woman gets separated and becomes a lone mother in year v, 0 if 
remains married 
- Rv is equal to 1 if v ≥1998, 0 otherwise.  
 
The intuition behind is that a married mother who gets separated after the reform faces different 
incentives to change her labour supply: before the reform, she knows that 40% of her earnings are 
taken from the maximum amount  but any change in her labour supply would not modify her right 
to the benefit; after the reform, she knows that by decreasing her hours of work to less than part-
time, she would lose the right to the benefit. The assumption of the model is that, in absence of 
the reform, married mothers who become lone mothers after the reform would behave the same 
as married mothers who became lone mothers before the reform. By considering only the flow of 
new lone mothers, I can overcome the phase-in problem2. Not only, new cohorts of lone mothers - 
observed when have just separated - should be of primary interest for policy-makers, more than a 
representative sample  of lone mothers at a certain point in time, which would over represent 
lone mothers who have been lone for long time3.  
 
                                                          
2
 Robustness checks are carried out and shown in Mogstad and Pronzato (2008, 2012) in order to make sure that 
compositional changes in the sample of mothers, before and after the reform, do not bias the estimates. 
3
 See Mogstad and Pronzato (2012) for what concerns the impact of the refom on long-lasting lone mothers.  
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3.2 A Discrete Choice Model of Work and Welfare Participation Decisions 4 
The Norwegian register data, I use for the estimation of the model (described in Section 4), 
provide accurate information on incomes and demographic characteristics but not hours of work. 
The model outlined below takes this feature into account, allowing time of work to be measured 
with an error.  
A lone mother, labelled n, is assumed to maximize a utility function  
 
 ),,( wtxU n                       (2) 
 
under the budget constraint  
 
 ),,( nnnn ytlTx                       (3) 
 
where 
- nx is the net household income,  
- nl is the gross monthly labour income of the lone mother in a full time job, 
- nt is the number of equivalent full time months of work in one calendar year, 
- nw is a welfare participation indicator,  
- ny is exogenous household gross income, 
- T(.) is the tax-benefit function which transforms gross income into net income. 
 
The lone mother faces a set of J discrete alternatives, defined by the combination of earnings and 
welfare participation decisions. She knows how much utility she would get from each alternative j 
and chooses the alternative which provides the largest one. We can decompose the utility 
function into two parts: the deterministic part and the stochastic part 
                                                          
4
 This paragraph follows Train’s book on Discrete Choice Methods and Simulations, chapter 2 (2003). Other papers used 
as references to write the model are Mc Fadden (1974), Moffitt (1983), MaCurdy et al. (1990), Ilmakunnas and Pudney 
(1990), Van Soest (1995), Hoynes (1996), Aaberge et al. (1999), Creedy and Kalb (2005), Creedy et al. (2006), Keane 
(2011), Bargain et al. (2012). 
 9 
 
 njnjnj VU       Jj                   (4), 
 
where Vnj captures the portion of utility which derives from observable characteristics, while εnj 
the portion from unobservable ones. The deterministic part of the utility Vnj may be seen as a 
function which relates the observable characteristics to the lone mothers’ utility 
 
 ),( nnjnj szVV           Jj                   (5), 
 
where znj are the observed attributes of the alternatives as faced by the lone mother, and sn the 
observed socio-demographic characteristics of the lone mother. I specify the deterministic part of 
the utility to be linear in parameters with a constant 
 
 jnjnj kqV  '   Jj                                  (6) 
 
where qnj is a vector of variables that relate to alternative j as faced by the lone mother n, θ are 
the coefficients of these variables, and k j is a constant that is specific to alternative j. The constant 
kj captures the average effect on utility of all factors not included in the model. The vector znj 
includes the net income available to the lone mother at alternative j and its square, the time of 
work required by alternative j and its square, a welfare participation indicator, and their 
interactions. The socio-demographic variables sn cannot enter the model directly, since they do 
not vary across alternatives. They are interacted with net income, time of work and the welfare 
indicator to allow utility from income and disutility from time of work and welfare participation to 
be different for women with different levels of education, age, nationality, numbers and ages of 
children: 
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where njx is her net household income, njt  her time of work, njw  her welfare participation 
indicator in each alternative j, and ns  are her demographic characteristics.  
Time of work nt  is not observed in the register data. I derive the expected time of work nt , 
expressed in equivalent full time months of work in a year, as the ratio between each woman’s 
annual earnings in the register data ( nn tl ) and the predicted monthly earnings from survey data (
nl ) in a full time job of a woman with same human capital characteristics:  
 
 
n
nn
n
l
tl
t                                                                                                                                (8). 
 
The relationship between true time of work nt  and expected time of work nt  is given by 
 
 nn
n
n
n tt
l
l
t                                                                                                                              (9), 
 
where   is negatively correlated with the unobservable characteristics which make a woman 
earn more. If a woman earns more than what, on average, a woman with the same observable 
characteristics does, it means that she needs to work less time than what I predict as expected 
time of work.   connects true and expected time of work and is assumed to be normally 
distributed. Therefore (7) becomes 
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nnjnnjnnjj
njnjnjnjnjnjnjnjnjnjnjnj
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where, for example, 
 
  66
~
                                (11). 
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The model I estimate allows disutility from time 3
~
  to be different for women with different 
unobservable characteristics: 
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                         (12). 
 
  coincides with   only if there is no difference in tastes due to unobservables among women5. 
However, I do not need to identify   because the main aim is to take into account that time of 
work is measured with an error. 
 
 
4 The Data 
 
The data used for the empirical analysis are from the register data of the Norwegian population in 
the period 1993-2001, which contains household and demographic information, and is merged 
with detailed income data from the Tax Assessment Files through unique individual identifiers. The 
income data are collected from tax records and other administrative registers rather than 
interviews and self-assessment methods. The coverage and reliability of Norwegian register data 
are considered to be exceptional, as is documented by the fact that the quality of such national 
data sets received the highest rating in a data quality survey in the Luxembourg Income Study 
database (Atkinson et al., 1995).  
The population of study comprises married, cohabiting and lone mothers who in each year were at 
least 18 years old and not more than 55, with the youngest child between 4 and 9 years old. From 
now on,  for simplicity,  I consider  married and cohabiting mothers together, referring generally to 
                                                          
5
 The model is estimated using the software Stata (command: mixlogit).  ~,
~
,
~
,
~
764  should be also allowed to vary 
among women but, in practice, the model does not converge when allowing unobservable heterogeneity in many 
parameters. For more details, see a longer version of the model in Pronzato (2012). 
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all of them as “married” 6. Self-employed women, students, as well as women receiving 
permanent disability benefits, are excluded from the analysis.  
The sample for the triple-difference model is composed of 1,121,898 women: “becoming” lone 
mothers (treatment group) and “staying” married mothers (control group), before and after the 
reform. The sample for the discrete choice model is composed of the sub-sample of lone mothers 
observed before the reform (7,921), representing what one would use in a typical ex-ante 
evaluation. The effect of the 1998 reform of the transitional benefit is evaluated on annual gross 
earnings rather than on hours of work. The reason for focusing on earnings to evaluate the effects 
of the reform on labour market participation is that I do not have data on working hours. To limit 
measurement error when using annual gross earnings, I use the consumer price index to make 
incomes from different periods comparable; throughout this paper the reference year is 1998, and 
€1 is set equal to NOK 8.4. Details on the sample selection are described in the next sections. 
 
4.1 Data for the Estimation of the Quasi-Experimental Evaluation Design 
The way the information is registered is very important for understanding the evaluation design: 
we know the marital status of the woman on January 1st of each year while gross earnings are 
measured annually, from January 1st to December 31st of each year.  The sample is then selected 
as follows. The treatment group after the reform is composed of the cohort of mothers who are 
married on January 1st 1997 (with the youngest child 2-7 years old), who are still married on 
January 1st 1998 (with the youngest child 3-8 years old), who are lone on January 1st 1999 (with the 
youngest 4-9 years old), therefore getting separated any day between January 2nd and December 
31st 1998. By comparing their earnings between 1999 and 1997, we estimate a change in earnings 
which may be due to many factors, among which the fact of becoming a lone mother, the work-
incentives provided by the welfare system, and other time varying factors7. The comparison with 
married mothers on January 1st 1997 (with the youngest child 2-7 years old), who are still married 
on January 1st 1998 (with the youngest child 3-8 years old), who stay married on January 1st 1999 
                                                          
6
 Register data do not allow for identification of cohabitant couples directly, but Galloway and Aaberge (2007) 
constructed a household type variable, derived from a large variety of information which can help to identify 
cohabitants indirectly. 
7
 For this cohort of mothers, we do not use information about their earnings in 1998, since we cannot know for what 
part of the year the mother was married and for what part of the year the mother was lone. Moreover, this temporal lag 
allows mothers to have time to adjust their behaviour.  
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(with the youngest 4-9 years old) helps to clean the total change in earnings by the other time-
varying factors (mainly, the child who is growing and the economic trend) and to identify the 
causal effect of becoming a lone mother on earnings after the reform.  By doing the same exercise 
before the reform (married mothers in 1995, in 1996, who may or may not be lone in 1997), I can 
identify the causal effect of becoming a lone mother on earnings before the reform. The 
difference between the effect of becoming a lone mother before and after the reform identifies 
the casual effect of the reform. In the analysis, I exploit all cohorts available in the data8, and 
include local unemployment rate and year time dummies as furthers control of the economic 
cycle.  
 
4.2 Data for the Estimation of the Discrete Choice Model 
From the sample described in the previous session, I select new lone mothers before the reform 
(in the years 1995, 1996, 1997). I assume lone mothers face at most 8 alternative choices, given by 
the joint decision of how much to work (4 alternatives) and whether or not participating in the 
welfare (2 alternatives).  
As explained in Section 3, expected time of work is obtained comparing annual earnings observed 
in the register data with potential monthly full time earnings from survey data. In order to 
construct potential earnings, I use the Norwegian part of the European Union Survey of Income 
and Living Conditions for the year 2004, I select women in the same age-range (18-55), and I 
estimate a Heckman regression. The dependent variable is hourly gross labour income. In the 
outcome equation I include two dummy variables for education (secondary and tertiary 
education), a variable for potential working experience (age - years of schooling - 7), its square, 
and a part time dummy.9 In the selection equation, I also consider the presence of dependent 
children, other household income, whether being in a couple, and living in a city. Results are 
reported in Table A1. In order to make survey earnings comparable to earnings in the register 
data, predicted hourly earnings are multiplied by typical hours of work in a full time job (38) and 
                                                          
8
 Mothers married in 1993/1994/1995/1997/1998/1999, who are still married in 1994/1995/1996/1998/1999/2000, 
who may or may not be lone mothers in 1995/1996/1997/1999/2000/2001. The first three cohorts are not influenced by 
the reform, while the last three are influenced by the reform. Time dummy variables are included in the regression 
model.  
9
 I include a part time dummy to test whether the wage rate can be considered constant over time of work. Part time 
wage rate is not significantly different from full time wage rate, as shown in Table A1.  
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number of weeks in a month, and adjusted in order to take into account nominal and real growth. 
10  
The 4 work alternatives are defined in the following way:  
 
1) First work alternative (which will be called “no work”): ratio between annual observed 
earnings and expected monthly earnings in a full time job smaller than 3, which 
corresponds to less than 9.5 hours a week (on average, in the data, 1 hour and half per 
week).   
2) Second work alternative (which will be called “short part time”): ratio between observed 
annual earnings and expected monthly earnings in a full time job larger or equal to 3 and 
smaller than 6, which corresponds to 9.5-19 hours a week (on average, in the data, 13 
hours per week).  
3) Third work alternative (which will be called “part time”): ratio between observed annual 
earnings and expected monthly earnings in a full time job larger or equal to 6 and smaller 
than 9, which corresponds to 19-28.5 hours a week (on average, in the data, 22 hours per 
week). 
4) Fourth work alternative (which will be called “full time”): ratio between observed annual 
earnings and expected monthly earnings in a full time job larger or equal to 9, which 
corresponds to more than 28.5 hours a week (on average, in the data, 33 hours per week).   
 
In the observed choice, the three objects of the utility function are defined as follows: (i) the 
observed welfare participation decision, (ii) the net income which derives from observed earnings 
through the tax-benefit function (2) and (iii) the expected number of months of work, obtained 
dividing the observed annual earning by potential monthly earnings in a full time job. For the other 
7 alternatives I construct counterfactuals.  
Suppose her observed earnings are €17,500 and she participates in the welfare (see example in 
Table 1). Given her human capital characteristics, she is supposed for example to earn €2,500 per 
month in a full time job. I classify her as working “part time” (17,500 / 2,500 = 7 equivalent full 
                                                          
10
 Prices are deflated to €-1998. Real growth is taken into account looking at the variation, year by year, of the basic 
amount (grunnbeløp), which is the official reference amount used for the up-rating of benefits and pensions.  
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time months; 22 hours per week). I construct three other earning alternatives: “no work”, working 
“short part time”, working “full time” (see Table 1, first five columns). The number of months 
chosen for each untaken work alternative (no work / short part time / full time) is drawn from the 
distribution of months of people choosing that alternative (no work / short part time / full time) 
(Aaberge et al., 2009). Predicted earnings are then imputed. In the example, Table 1, the drawn 
numbers of months are 0, 4 and 12, and earnings are, respectively, €0, €10,000, and €30,000. 
 
Table 1: An example of Choice set 
 
Work Take Alternative Time of Labour  Transitional … Total net  Decision 
  up   work income benefit   income   
No Work Yes 1 0 0 8,000  17,000 0 
No Work No 2 0 0 0  9,000 0 
Short Part  Yes 3 4 10,000 5,000  23,000 0 
Short Part  No 4 4 10,000 0  18,000 0 
Part Time Yes 5 7 17,500 2,000  26,000 1 
Part Time No 6 7 17,500 0  24,000 0 
Full Time Yes 7 12 30,000 0  - - 
Full Time No 8 12 30,000 0   33,000 0 
Notes: The choice set of a woman who takes-up the transitional benefit with observed earnings equal to 
€17,500 and potential monthly earnings equal to €2,500.  
 
For each earning alternative, she can decide whether to participate in the welfare. The transitional 
benefit is calculated as follows. The maximum annual amount of the benefit is around €8,000 per 
year. From this maximum amount, 40% of earnings exceeding €2,500 are subtracted. In Table 1, 
6th column, we can see the corresponding amounts. For this woman, the 7th alternative is dropped, 
since the related full time earnings are too large to be still eligible for the benefit. 
I then simulate the childcare benefit, another benefit which depends on labour supply, given as a 
reimbursement for extra-costs for childcare, occurred when the mother works. All other remaining 
benefits are only available in the data as a total amount. However, none of them depends on her 
working decisions. Finally, I simulate taxes, and obtain the total net income she can have in 
different work/welfare alternatives (8th column, Table 1). Poverty is defined by a dichotomous 
variable taking the value of 1 if the lone mother’s household has annual equivalent disposable 
income below 60 percent of the median annual equivalent disposable income in the overall 
population, and 0 otherwise. The 9th column (Table 2) indicates in which alternatives the 
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household is considered poor: in the example, the household would be poor if the mother decided 
not to work, or worked short part time and did not take-up the benefit. The variable, in the 10th 
column (Table 1), indicates the decision observed. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample of lone mothers before the time of the reform are shown in 
Table 2. This also represents the sample of reference for the simulation of the optimal policy 
(which minimizes poverty) shown in Section 6.  
 
Table 2: The Sample of Lone Mothers before the Reform  
 
Variable Mean 
Income 24,855 
 (6,550) 
Time of work 8.38 
 (5.14) 
Welfare participation 0.489 
Age: younger than 32 years old 0.362 
Age: 32-36 years old 0.341 
Age: older than 36 years old 0.297 
< 11 years of schooling 0.253 
11-12 years of schooling 0.553 
> 12 years of schooling 0.194 
Youngest child 4-5 years old 0.499 
Youngest child 6-7 years old 0.310 
Youngest child 8-9 years old 0.191 
One child 0.320 
Two children 0.455 
More than two children 0.225 
Immigrant  0.010 
  
Observations 7,921 
Notes: average values, standard deviations in brackets for continuous variables. Time of work expressed in 
equivalent full time months. 
 
 
5 Comparing the Estimated Effects of the Reform 
 
5.1 Quasi-Experimental Estimated Effects and Comparison with the Simulated Effects of the 
Discrete Choice Model 
Results of the triple-difference model are shown in Table 3. In general, I find a positive effect of 
the reform: lone mothers increase their earnings of €384 per year. When distinguishing women by 
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level of education, results appear positive and significant only for low and medium high educated 
women, non-significant for highly educated women. We observe that the introduction of the 
reform has reduced the distance between lone and married mothers: before the reform becoming 
a lone mother implies, on average, a decrease of 702€ in earnings; after the reform, it implies a 
decrease of only 320€ (384-704). Results are robust to different specifications and to the inclusion 
of more control variables11. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Effects of the Reform, using the Triple-Difference Evaluation Design   
 
 All women Low educated 
(< 11 years of 
schooling) 
Medium educated 
(11-12 years of 
schooling) 
High educated 
(>12 years of 
schooling) 
Reform 384 658 476 -79 
(95% confidence interval) (195,572) (276,1040) (238,714) (-550,392) 
Becoming a lone mother -704 -1,284 -703 371 
(95% confidence interval) (-841,-567) (-1,542, 1,026) (-878, -528) (16, 727) 
Unemployment rate -121 -51 -135 -123 
(95% confidence interval) (-160, -82) (-137, 35) (-186, -84) (-207, -38) 
Observations  1,121,898 207,808 633,870 358,294 
Average earnings  
before the reform 
 
16,748 
 
11,692 
 
15,982 
 
25,508 
Notes: estimated effects of the reform when using the triple-difference design, together with the 95% 
confidence intervals, the number of observations, and the average earnings before the reform.  
 
 
5.2 Estimated Behavioural Parameters from the Discrete Choice Model 
I estimate the effects of income, time of work, welfare participation and their interactions with 
other socio-demographic variables, on the probability of choosing one of the alternatives, using a 
mixed logit specification with the coefficient of time of work treated as random coefficient, 
assumed to be normally distributed, as outlined in Section 3. Results are reported in Table 4. The 
model is estimated without any restriction imposed on the utility function. To check that the utility 
function respects the concavity and monotonicity properties, I check the derivatives with respect 
to the utility arguments. The first derivative with respect to income is positive for the whole 
sample as well as the first derivative with respect to time of work is negative for the whole sample. 
Second derivatives are in the expected direction, as shown in Table 4. Utility is decreasing in 
welfare participation for 96% of the sample. The standard deviation of the random coefficient is 
                                                          
11
 See Mogstad and Pronzato (2008, 2012).  
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significantly different from zero, revealing an important role of unobserved heterogeneity and/or 
measurement error.  
The interaction between income and time of work is positive, which may be explained by the 
presence of better positions in the labour market that, even if imply longer hours of work, increase 
woman’s utility. The interaction between welfare participation and income is positive: since a 
large part of lone mothers’ income comes from other benefits in Norway, the positive interaction 
could reveal that the cost of participating is lower for women who also participate in other welfare 
programs. The interaction between welfare and time of work is also positive: women who work 
more may be more informed because they are more likely to talk with other people at the place of 
work or they may suffer less from welfare stigma because they feel they do not completely 
depend on welfare12. Results concerning number and age of children are in the expected direction: 
on the one hand, having more and younger children increases the cost of working; on the other 
hand, it increases utility from income. Immigrant women have more disutility from time of work. 
This finding could result from the fact that, given their level of education, they are in poorly paid 
jobs. Younger women have less disutility from participating in the welfare while the cost of the 
welfare is not linear by years of education. Women with secondary schooling have less disutility 
from participating in the welfare than higher and lower educated women. This may capture 
different aspects of welfare participation: on the one hand, if information is needed then better 
educated women may be more prompt to apply for the benefit; on the other hand, better 
educated women may suffer more to be dependent from welfare. 
                                                          
12 Generally speaking, in the Norwegian context, where applications can be done on line and transfers can be received 
in the bank account without friends and family necessarily knowing, we could expect the role of the welfare stigma to be 
relatively less important. 
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Table 4: Discrete Choice Model Estimates  
 
 Beta St err  Beta St err  Beta St err 
         
Income 1.090*** 0.074 Time -0.793*** 0.116 Welfare -3.647*** 0.550 
   St dev (time) 0.254*** 0.036    
Income sq. -0.012*** 0.001 Time sq.  0.001 0.003    
Income*time 0.009*** 0.003 Time*welfare 0.169*** 0.046 Income*welfare 0.031*** 0.011 
         
Income interacted with  Time interacted with  Welfare interacted with  
Mother's age ( < 32) 0.007 0.030 Mother's age ( < 32) -0.003 0.038 Mother's age ( < 32) 0.393** 0.156 
Mother's age (32-36) -0.001 0.025 Mother's age (32-36) 0.053 0.034 Mother's age (32-36) 0.342*** 0.124 
Mother's age ( > 36)   Mother's age ( > 36)   Mother's age ( > 36)   
Schooling ( < 11) 0.077* 0.042 Schooling ( < 11) -0.250*** 0.060 Schooling ( < 11) -0.213 0.224 
Schooling (11-12) -0.036 0.035 Schooling (11-12) -0.128** 0.054 Schooling (11-12) 0.547*** 0.158 
Schooling ( > 12)   Schooling ( > 12)   Schooling ( > 12)   
One child -0.154*** 0.031 One child 0.389*** 0.044 One child 0.044 0.150 
Two children -0.045* 0.024 Two children 0.157*** 0.033 Two children -0.049 0.123 
More than two    More than two    More than two    
Youngest child 4-5 0.068** 0.027 Youngest child 4-5 -0.133*** 0.036 Youngest child 4-5 -0.208* 0.126 
Youngest child 6-7 0.046* 0.027 Youngest child 6-7 -0.081** 0.036 Youngest child 6-7 -0.003 0.12 
Youngest child 8-9   Youngest child 8-9   Youngest child 8-9   
Immigrant 0.038 0.082 Immigrant -0.280** 0.113 Immigrant -0.261 0.496 
         
No-work intercepts    Short time intercepts    Part time intercepts    
Welfare -1.064*** 0.242 Welfare -1.421*** 0.159 Welfare -0.606*** 0.106 
No welfare  0.654** 0.323 No welfare  -1.059*** 0.207 No welfare  -0.770*** 0.120 
         
Observations  59,293 
Notes: Mixed logit regression with time treated as random coefficient; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. 
Income variables divided by 1,000. Time of work expressed in equivalent full time months.  
 20 
 
5.3 Simulating the Effect of the Reform 
In order to simulate the reform with the discrete choice model, I need to parameterize the transitional 
benefit according to the new rules. There are three important changes. First, working requirements are 
imposed. Second, the age limit for eligibility on the youngest child is lowered, and time limits on welfare 
participation are introduced. And third, in-work benefit levels are raised.  
The increase of the maximum amount (from around 8,300€ to 9,500€ per year) not only makes the 
transitional benefit more generous but also makes women more likely to be eligible: before the reform, 
only women earning less than €1,900 per month can receive the benefit while, after the reform, women 
earning until €2,200 per month are also eligible. This results in a larger number of alternatives in the 
choice set for those women now eligible to receive the benefit. According to the change of the age limit, 
women with the youngest child aged 9 years old are not allowed to receive the transitional benefit 
anymore. The reform requires lone mothers to be in training, to work at least part time, or to seek work. 
The law does not give details about the “training” and “seeking work” activities. I do not have any 
information on what these activities consist of, whether it was difficult to have a training period, what 
women were asked in case they were seeking work. And I do not know whether these activities were 
easily approved by the public administration, and for how long they were compatible with being eligible 
for the benefit.  Moreover, register data do not have information on training and periods of seeking 
work, so that I cannot know who was taking this decisions, even after the reform. What I can do is to 
assume that lone mothers receiving the maximum amount of the transitional benefit after the reform 
are engaged in one of the two activities. In fact, the maximum amount is given only to women earning 
less 200€ per month and it is reasonable to assume there is no part time job in Norway paid less than 
200€ a month. The percentage of non-working women on welfare after the reform (supposed to be in 
training or seeking-work activities) is 7.0% while the percentage of non-working women on welfare is 
18.5% before the reform. While before the reform, the possibility of receiving the transitional benefit 
and not working was a woman’s decision, after the reform it is the result of the woman’s decision and 
the new constraints imposed by the law. We may expect women with lower level of education to be 
more likely to be observed in training or seeking work activities after the reform, but this does not seem 
to be the case when looking at post-reform data. The percentage of non-working women receiving the 
benefit before the reform was 26.4% among low educated women, 14.0% among medium educated 
women, 11.0% among highly educated women. The percentage of non-working women receiving the 
benefit after the reform (assumed to be in training or seeking work activities) is 8.7% among low 
educated women, 6.3% among medium educated women, 7.6% among high educated women. In order 
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to reproduce what I observe in the data, I drop randomly the alternatives of non-working and 
participating in the welfare for a number of women so that the percentage of women taking this 
decision - with the new rules - is 7.0%. The simulated effects of the reform from the structural model are 
calculated as weighted earnings, given by the sum of earnings in each alternative times the probability 
of choosing that alternative. Results are shown in Table 5. The simulated effect of the whole reform is 
positive: on average, lone mothers increase their earnings of €45013 per year. The effect appears 
heterogeneous for women with different level of education: positive and stronger for low and medium 
educated women, while negative and smaller for high educated women14. We can separate the effects 
of the introduction of the working requirements and new age limits from the effect of more generous 
benefits. The bottom part of Table 5 summarizes the results. The introduction of working requirements 
has increased women’s earnings, as expected. The effect is larger for low and medium educated women 
than for highly educated women. Also the new age limit has a positive but small effect on work 
decisions. Making the benefit more generous has the expected negative effect on annual earnings. The 
effect is relatively large also for highly educated women. In fact, for highly educated women, the 
increase in the maximum amount has made them eligible in more work alternatives. Results from 
different specifications of the model are included in the Appendix (Table A2).  
 
Table 5: Simulated Effects of the Reform, using the Discrete Choice Model   
 
 All women Low educated 
(< 11 years of 
schooling) 
Medium educated 
(11-12 years of 
schooling) 
High educated 
(>12 years of 
schooling) 
Reform  450 788 516 -176 
(95% confidence interval) (399,501) (728,848) (462,569) (-215,-136) 
Increased generosity -835 -907 -861 -665 
Age limit 115 15 156 130 
Activity requirements 916 1,071 1,030 390 
Observations  7,921 2,002 4,380 1,539 
Notes: simulated effects of the whole reform (with the 95% confidence intervals) and of each policy parameter 
changed by the reform, predicted by using the estimated parameters of the discrete choice model.  
 
                                                          
13
 In order to calculate the confidence intervals around the predictions from the structural model, I employ the bootstrap 
method: I draw 100 new samples from the original one, each of them containing the original number of observations  (N = 
7,921), where each observation may be repeated more than once (with replacement); I re-estimate the model using each of the 
100 new samples; I parameterize the reform and get 100 sets of predictions. From these predictions I calculate means, standard 
errors, and confidence intervals.  
14
 Imposing the proportion of women in training or seeking work activities to 7.0% implies, according to the discrete choice 
model estimates, to grant the possibility of receiving the benefit without working to 40 women out of 100.   
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The comparison between tables 3 and 5 represents a first contribution of the paper. Predictions from 
the discrete choice model, usually considered econometrically more fragile, are confirmed by the triple-
difference model. Results of the two methods are, in fact, positive and significant, confidence intervals 
overlap, and point estimates are rather close. Not only, the discrete choice model predicts well also by 
level of education: the positive effect is larger for low-medium educated women, while slightly negative 
for highly educated women. 
 
 
6 New Policy Scenarios 
 
The comparison between the results of the discrete choice model and the triple-difference model makes 
me confident in using the behavioural estimates to find which policy changes to the transitional benefit 
would have minimized poverty among lone mothers. Before the reform, the percentage of poor lone 
mothers is 11.8, as shown in the 1st column of Table 6. At the bottom of the Table, the parameters of the 
reform are reported.  
The aim is to find the policy parameters which minimize poverty15. I look at two situations: 
 
 when the working requirements are those implemented at the time of the reform: in order to 
be eligible for the benefit, women are required to be in part-time work, to seek work, to be on 
training (case 1); 
 when the working requirements are introduced without the possibility of training or seeking 
work (case 2). 
 
These two scenarios should be interesting benchmarks for policy makers. The first scenario represents 
the case in which policy makers want to introduce working requirements but allow women to invest 
time in training and seeking work. The second scenario can be seen as a “long term” realization of the 
reform: after the first period spent in training or seeking work, women have to work to be still eligible 
for the benefit. In this last scenario I also allow time of work to vary in order to choose the working 
requirement which minimizes poverty. In the first scenario, instead, working requirements are 
reproduced as observed at the time of the reform. Another difference between the two scenarios is the 
                                                          
15
 As conventionally done, a household is considered poor when the equivalent household income is below 60% of the median 
equivalent household income in the general population. 
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amount of resources involved: “stricter” working requirements (case 2) imply a lower public 
expenditure, which derives from giving less generous benefits (due to the withdrawal rate) and from 
cancelling welfare for women who eventually decide not to work. In the 2nd and 3rd columns of Table 6, I 
report the simulated effects of the actual reform on poverty in the two policy scenarios. Poverty 
decreases to 8.6% (case 1) and to 9.4 (case 2) while the average cost per woman is, respectively, €3,163 
and €1,920.  
 
Table 6: New Policy Scenarios  
 
 Before  Actual reform Optimal policy 
 the reform Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 
      
Poverty (%) 11.8 8.6 9.4 7.2 9.0 
      
Policy parameters      
Max amount 8,340 9,591 
40% 
2,513 
9 
8,340 8,173 
Withdrawal rate 40% 24% 30% 
Disregarded amount 2,513 2,061 2,990 
Age limit 10 9 9 
Work requirements  none as in 1998 work ≥ 6FT as in 1998 work ≥ 6FT 
Average cost  €2,634 €3,163 €1,920 ≤ €3,163 ≤ €1,920 
Notes: a lone mother, in order to be eligible for the benefit, is required to work part-time, seek work or be in 
training (case 1); a lone mother, in order to be eligible for the benefit, is required to work for a given amount of 
time (case 2).  
 
 
In order to find the optimal policies, under revenue neutrality, I vary the maximum amount of the 
benefit, the withdrawal rate, the disregarded amount, the age limit and, only for case 2, the working 
requirements. In order to find the parameters of the reform I proceed with a two-step maximization 
procedure16. The results are shown in Table 6. If we consider the case where working requirements are 
implemented as in 1998 with the possibility of training and seeking work (case 1), with an average 
expenditure of €3,163 per lone mother, we observe a further decrease in poverty to 7.2%. Comparing 
the parameters of the benefit between the “actual reform” and the “optimal policy”, we see that the 
                                                          
16
 In the first step, I widen the interval around each parameter in turn to try all possible combinations of the parameters, until I 
cannot find any additional combination that gives a lower level of poverty. When I arrive to this stage, the policy parameters’ 
intervals are: maximum amount: 6,672–13,344 (case 1), 3,336–10,008 (case 2), withdrawal rate:  0–64 % (case 1), 16–48 % 
(case 2), disregarded amount: 1,005–5,026 (case 1), 0–8,042 (case 2); age limit: 7–10 (case 1, case 2); working requirements: 0–
8 equivalent full time months of work (case 2). In the second step, within the above intervals for each parameter I try all the 
possible combinations considering small variation in the parameters each time, in order to find the “optimal” solutions which 
minimize poverty.  
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reduction in poverty is a consequence of the reduction of the withdrawal rate and of the disregarded 
amount, while the maximum amount and age limit are the ones observed, respectively, in the pre and 
post reform period. In the second scenario (case 2), we also observe a decline in poverty which is now 
equal to 9.0%. Also in this case, the withdrawal rate is the parameter which is more distant from the 
observed one. The maximum amount is still around €8,000 per year while, the disregarded amount has 
increased. In this scenario, I allowed the required time of work to vary. However, the optimal one is 
confirmed to be 6 months a year (part time). Also the age limit is confirmed to be 9 years old.  
Could they have reformed the transitional benefit in a more efficient way investing the same amount of 
public resources? Yes, the paper shows that this would have been possible, not by increasing the 
generosity of the benefit, but through a reduction of the withdrawal rate so that decision to work could 
have been more attractive, leading to higher income, and lower poverty.  
 
 
7 Conclusions  
 
In this paper, I compare the effect of the 1998 Norwegian welfare reform on lone mothers’ earnings 
estimated using a triple-difference model and a discrete choice model of earnings and welfare 
participation decisions. The reform increases the maximum amount of the transitional benefit, 
introduces new working requirements and changes time limits in order to be eligible for it. A first 
contribution of the paper is to compare two different ways of doing policy evaluation. From both the 
evaluation methods, we observe a positive effect on lone mothers’ earnings, driven by behavioural 
responses of lower and medium educated women. The two strategies help the understanding of the 
policy impact in a complementary way: while the focus of the triple-difference model is to measure 
what really happened, the challenge of the discrete choice model is to predict what potentially can 
happen. Both aspects are important from a policy point of view. The fact that predictions provided by 
the discrete choice model track the results of the triple-difference analysis gives credibility to both the 
approaches. From a policy point of view, the availability of structural models gives policy makers the 
opportunity to plan how to use rationally the resources at disposal to pursue  their social objects. The 
main contribution of the paper is to suggest what would work better for fighting lone mothers’ (and 
their children) poverty. In the studied case, we observe that – under revenue neutrality – lone mothers’ 
poverty could be more efficiently reduced by lowering the withdrawal rate. This would give women the 
incentive to work and earn more, and to reach a level of income beyond the poverty-line threshold.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Earnings Equation  
 
 Beta St err 
Hourly wage   
Tertiary education 7.066*** 0.908 
Secondary education 2.605*** 0.655 
Lower education   
Work experience 0.431*** 0.112 
Work experience sq. -0.007*** 0.002 
Part time job -0.021 0.255 
Constant 6.700*** 2.164 
Selection    
Tertiary education 1.163*** 0.120 
Secondary education 0.518*** 0.108 
Lower education   
Work experience 0.162*** 0.011 
Work experience sq. -0.003*** 0.000 
Married/cohabitant 0.260*** 0.084 
Dependent children -0.182*** 0.070 
Household income -0.026*** 0.006 
Living in a city 0.000 0.058 
Constant -1.508*** 0.146 
   
Lambda 1.051 1.462 
Rho 0.21  
   
Observations 2,667 
Notes: Heckman regression; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. Hourly 
wage is expressed in € - 1998. Source: EU-SILC (2004).  
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 Table A2: Sensitivity Analyses 
 
 All women Low educated Medium educated High educated 
Random coefficients:     
Time (Table 3)     
Reform  450 788 516 -176 
Increased generosity -835 -907 -861 -665 
Age limit 115 15 156 130 
Activity requirements 916 1,071 1,030 390 
No random      
coefficients     
Reform  797 1,328 846 -34 
Increased generosity -1,034 -1,034 -1,117 -797 
Age limit 207 314 204 74 
Activity requirements 1,431 1,945 1,537 459 
Random coefficients:     
time, income, welfare     
Reform  416 704 482 -145 
Increased generosity -833 -894 -853 -698 
Age limit 119 30 165 104 
Activity requirements 915 1,079 1,034 365 
Notes: simulated effects of the reform when using different econometric specifications of the discrete choice 
model. The top part of the Table reports the estimates  shown in Table 3, the middle part of the Table reports the 
estimates without unobserved heterogeneity, the bottom part of the Table reports the estimates when allowing 
unobserved heterogeneity in time of work, income and welfare participation.  
 
 
